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I. INTRODUCTION
In Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,2 the U.S. Supreme
Court decided its most significant case on equal education opportu-
nity. In the year of Brown's fiftieth anniversary, Topeka, Kansas
again provides the site for what may become widely-cited as a revolu-
tionary decision on equal education opportunity. In December 2003,
Shawnee County, Kansas District Court Judge Terry Bullock held
that the Kansas system of funding schools provided unequal educa-
tional funding and was unconstitutional. His ruling in Montoy v.
State was in response to a lawsuit filed in 1999, claiming that the
State's funding formula is unconstitutional, because it is "inadequate
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law.
1. No. 99-C-1738 (Shawnee County, Kan. Dist. Ct. Dec. 2, 2003) (Memorandum
Decision and Preliminary Interim Order); Montoy v. State, No. 99-C-1738,
2004 WL 1094555 (Shawnee County, Kan. Dist. Ct. May 11, 2004) (Decision and
Order Remedy), available at http://www.shawneecourt.org/decisions/Montoy
(REMEDY).html.
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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and inequitable."3 Judge Bullock withheld issuing a final order and
gave the Kansas legislature and governor until July 1, 2004 to remedy
the system. The legislature considered numerous proposals, but failed
to reach an agreement and adjourned on May 8, 2004, without chang-
ing the existing formula or allocating additional resources. On May
11, Judge. Bullock issued his Decision and Order in the case, freezing
all payments from the State to school districts, effective June 30,
2004. The order required that public schools be closed on June 30 and
kept closed until the legislature took corrective action to eliminate the
"inequitable and inadequate" educational system in the state:
This action by the court will terminate all spending functions under the un-
constitutional funding provisions, effectively putting our school system on
"pause" until the unconstitutional funding defects are remedied by the legisla-
tive and executive branches of our government. Although this action may de-
lay our children's education slightly (should the other branches fail to respond
quickly), it will end the inadequate and inequitable education being provided
now and the disparate damage presently being done to the most vulnerable of
our children. 4
II. THE KANSAS SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION AND
RURAL SCHOOLS
The Kansas Supreme Court issued a stay of Judge Bullock's order
on May 19, 2004 and heard oral arguments in the case on August 30,
2004.5 In my Article in the 2003 Symposium issue of the Nebraska
Law Review on rural school finance litigation, I concluded that equita-
ble claims were still viable for rural school finance litigation, but noted
that even in successful cases, the attempts to find appropriate reme-
dies presented problems and required that the appropriate remedy be
carefully considered as a part of litigation strategy.6 In that same is-
sue, Malhoit and Black discuss the approaches that courts have taken
3. Montoy v. State, No. 99-C-1738, 2003 WL 22902963, at *51 (Shawnee County,
Kan. Dist. Ct. Dec. 2, 2003) (Memorandum Decision and Preliminary Interim
Order).
4. Montoy v. State, No. 99-C-1738, 2004 WL 1094555 (Shawnee County, Kan. Dist.
Ct. May 11, 2004) (Decision and Order Remedy), available at http://www.shaw-
neecourt.org/decisions/Montoy(REMEDY).html.
5. An appeal was filed and the state supreme court issued a stay of Judge Bullock's
order on May 19, 2004. Order, Emergency Motion to Stay District Court Proceed-
ings, Montoy v. State (Kan. May 19, 2004) (No. 92,032), available at http://www.
kscourts.org/schoolfinanceorder20040519.pdf. See discussion infra accompany-
ing notes 25-38.
6. See Anna Williams Shavers, Rethinking the Equity vs. Adequacy Debate: Implica-
tions for Rural School Finance Reform Litigation, 82 NEB. L. REV. 133, 178-81
(2003).
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to remedying inadequacy and inequity in school finance.
7 Judge Bul-
lock's order provides an opportunity to revisit this issue.
Since nearly half the schools in Kansas are rural, and the state
ranks seventh in the percentage of its students who attend smaller
rural schools,8 the litigation and resulting orders may have significant
implications for rural school districts in Kansas and other states.
Like many states, the school finance litigation in Kansas dates
back to the 1970s.9 In 1972, the trial court in Caldwell v. State10
found the Kansas public education-funding system unconstitutional
on equal protection grounds, because the State had not provided
enough aid to offset disparities among school districts in taxing efforts
and per-pupil expenditures. In response, the Kansas Legislature en-
acted the 1973 School District Equalization Act ("SDEA"), which es-
tablished a foundation level of school funding per pupil, in which the
State would make up the difference between local revenues and this
target amount. Subsequently, in 1990, plaintiffs, including forty-two
school districts, in the consolidated lawsuit Mock v. State,
1 1 chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the SDEA and the state school finance
formula, alleging that the school districts receive less than a propor-
tionate share of the funding for elementary and secondary education.
The Mock plaintiffs claimed that the system, which relied upon local
mill levies, was unconstitutional. In advance of trial, Judge Bullock
issued a pretrial opinion on certain questions of law raised by the law-
suits, finding the State's school finance formula unconstitutional.
1 2
He held that under the Education Article of the Kansas Constitu-
7. See Gregory C. Malhoit & Derek W. Black, The Power of Small Schools: Achieving
Equal Educational Opportunity Through Academic Success and Democratic Citi-
zenship, 82 NEB. L. REV. 50, 67-74 (2003).
8. Elizabeth Beeson & Marty Strange, Rural School and Community Trust, Why
Rural Matters: The Need for Every State to Take Action on Rural Education 40
(2003), available at http://www.ruraledu.org/streport/pdf/ks-2003.pdf; see also
NAT'L ASS'N OF STATE BDS. OF EDUC., RURAL EDUCATION: WHAT'S DOWN THE ROAD
FOR SCHOOLS 2 (1996) (The 1996 NASBE report provided figures that, in Kansas
81.3 percent of school districts were rural and 51.7 percent of students attended
rural schools.) (citing NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
COMMON CORE OF DATA PUBLIC SCHOOL UNIVERSE, 1991-1992), available at http:/
/www.nasbe.org/Educational Issues/Reports/Rural-Schools.pdf.
9. See Charles Berger, Equity Without Adjudication: Kansas School Finance Reform
and the 1992 School District Finance and Quality Performance Act, 27 J.L. &
EDUC. 1 (1998).
10. No. 50616, slip. op. (Johnson County, Kan. Dist. Ct. Aug. 30, 1972).
11. No. 91-CV-1009 (Shawnee County, Kan. Dist. Ct. Oct. 14, 1991).
12. Mock v. State, No. 91-CV-1009 (Shawnee County, Kan. Dist. Ct. Oct. 14, 1991)
(opinion on questions of law presented in advance of trial), reprinted in Philip C.
Kissam, Constitutional Thought and Public Schools: An Essay on Mock v. State of
Kansas, 31 WASHBURN L.J. 474, 489-505 (1992).
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tion,13 "the duty owed by the Legislature to each child to furnish him
or her with an educational opportunity is equal to that owed every
other child."14 Judge Bullock agreed to delay the trial in order to give
the governor and the legislature the chance to consider taking correc-
tive action consistent with the principles that he had identified. A gu-
bernatorial task force was created, which devised a new school finance
system that was submitted to the legislature, leading to the School
District Finance and Quality Performance Act ("SDFQPA"), which
was adopted in 1992.15 The SDFQPA created a statewide property
tax and a statewide system for collecting and distributing taxes for all
districts. Rural and small schools initially benefited from the redistri-
bution of taxes. 16 The system also set, among other things, a mini-
mum level of state aid per pupil and an accountability system based
upon minimum state standards in specified courses.
Following passage of the new act, Judge Bullock dismissed some of
the consolidated cases and transferred jurisdiction of the remaining
cases to Judge Marla Luckert. After a trial of the cases in the summer
of 1993, Judge Luckert issued her 168-page opinion in December 1993,
finding the 1992 law unconstitutional. Judge Luckert stayed the ef-
fective date of the finding until July 1, 1994. On appeal, the Kansas
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 1992 Act in Unified
School District No. 229 v. State.17 In response to the district court's
finding that the Act violated section 6(b) of Article 6 of the Kansas
Constitution, in that it does not contain "suitable provision for finance
of the educational interests of the state," the Kansas Supreme Court
decided that the constitutional provision placed the responsibility for
determining what was "suitable" with the legislature.18
Montoy v. State was filed by two school districts and thirty-one stu-
dents from those districts. The students represented various pro-
tected classes, including African-American, Hispanic, Asian-
American, students with disabilities, and those of non-United States
13. KAN. CONST. art. 6, § 6b ("The Legislature shall make suitable provision for fi-
nance of the educational interests of the state ... ).
14. Kissam, supra note 12, at 475; See also Mock v. State, No. 91-CV-1009 (Shawnee
County, Kan. Dist. Ct. Oct. 14, 1991).
15. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-6405 to -6440 (2003). The Legislature also established the
School District Capital Improvements State Aid Program, based on an equaliza-
tion concept, in order to assist school districts in making bond and interest pay-
ments. The latter was enacted in response to Judge Bullock's pretrial ruling that
all costs-including capital expenditures-are included in the constitutional
mandate placed on the Legislature by the Education Article of the Kansas Consti-
tution. See Berger, supra note 9.
16. Nancy Niles Lusk, A Primer on Kansas School Finance, KANSAs CiTY STAR, Feb.
28, 2004, at httpJ/www.kansascity.com/mld/kansascitystar/news/local/states/
kansas/counties/johnsoncounty/cities-neighborhoods/shawnee/8060430.htm.
17. 885 P.2d 1170 (Kan. 1994).
18. Id. at 1182.
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origin. Named as defendants were the State of Kansas, the Governor
of Kansas, the state treasurer, each member of the State Board of Ed-
ucation, and the Commissioner of the Kansas Department of Educa-
tion. The plaintiffs alleged three separate violations of the Kansas
Constitution: (1) a failure of the Legislature to make "suitable provi-
sion for finance of the educational interests of the state" as required by
KAN. CONST. art. 6, § 6(b); (2) violations of state equal protection; and
(3) state substantive due process violations. All of the violations were
based upon a challenge of the total amount of funds provided to their
school districts. 19 Specifically, the plaintiffs challenged the low-en-
rollment weight, the local option budget, special education excess
costs, and capital outlay factors utilized in the school-funding
formula. 20 They also claimed that, under the formula, too much
money goes to rural school districts. Judge Bullock sua sponte granted
judgment for the defendants, on procedural and substantive grounds,
primarily basing his decision on the supreme court's 1994 decision in
Unified School District No. 229 that upheld the state education fi-
nance system. However, in January 2003, the Kansas Supreme Court
reversed Judge Bullock's dismissal and ordered the case back to the
trial court for further proceedings. The court instructed Judge Bul-
lock (1) that Unified School District No. 22921 required a more vigor-
ous analysis than Judge Bullock had presumed and (2) that, while the
legislature had the responsibility to promulgate education standards,
the "ultimate question on suitability" remained with the court.
2 2
After an eight-day bench trial, on December 2, 2003, Judge Bullock
issued a preliminary order in the case, finding that the school finance
formula was unconstitutional, and setting a deadline of July 1, 2004,
to allow a full legislative session for "our Legislature and our state's
chief executive [to] step up to the challenge to bring the Kansas school
funding scheme into compliance" with the state constitution. 23 In
reaching his decision, Judge Bullock first reexamined his opinion in
Mock v. State,24 concluding that the analysis was still good law since
the decision had not been appealed, and then he discussed the analy-
sis provided by the Kansas Supreme Court in Unified School District.
19. Montoy v. State, No. 99-C-1738, 2004 WL 1094555 (Shawnee County, Kan. Dist.
Ct. May 11, 2004) (Decision and Order Remedy), available at http://www.shaw-
neecourt.org/decisions/Montoy(REMEDY).html.
20. At the same time, the same attorneys filed a case on behalf of many of the same
plaintiffs in the U.S. District Court, arguing that the school finance scheme vio-
lated the federal Constitution. Robinson v. Cahill, 358 A.2d 457 (N.J. 1976).
21. District Court Judge Luckert, who decided Unified School District No. 229, was
appointed to the Kansas Supreme Court in November 2002.
22. Montoy v. State, 62 P.3d 228, 234 (Kan. 2003).
23. Montoy v. State, No. 99-C-1738, 2003 WL 22902963, at *50 (Shawnee County,
Kan. Dist. Ct. Dec. 2, 2003) (Memorandum Decision and Preliminary Interim
Order).
24. No. 91-CV-1009 (Shawnee County, Kan. Dist. Ct. Oct. 14, 1991).
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Judge Bullock provided guidelines for making the funding system
more equitable, more adequate, and for providing more resources for
the school districts educating the groups represented by the plaintiffs.
The court retained jurisdiction and set a date to reconvene in July
2004 to review the actions taken by both the governor and the legisla-
ture to remedy the constitutional violations.
When the Kansas Legislature failed to approve a school finance
plan and ended its 2004 session, just three days later, Judge Bullock
issued his order to close schools. The State Attorney General filed a
motion with the Supreme Court seeking a stay of Judge Bullock's or-
der until the Supreme Court could rule on the appeal. The parties in
the lawsuit then filed a joint order seeking clarification of Judge Bul-
lock's remedies order. Specifically, the parties asked that the judge
clarify whether the order ceasing the expenditure of funds for educa-
tion would apply to the expenditure of funds related to financial obli-
gations for the acquisition of capital assets. Judge Bullock's school-
closing order resulted in some confusion, causing him to issue a clari-
fying Memorandum and Decision Order that same day which permit-
ted the expenditure of funds for the financial obligations related to the
acquisition of capital assets. 25 The decision did not prohibit school
districts from paying general obligation bonds, temporary notes, no-
fund leases and warrants, or lease-purchases, or from making other
related payments to school districts from the school district capital im-
provements fund. On May 19, 2004, the Kansas Supreme Court
granted the stay requested by the State.2 6 Oral arguments on the
case were held on August 30, 2004. In response to Judge Bullock's
findings that the school finance formula favors rural school districts
over urban school districts and that there is no rational basis for low-
enrollment weighting, rural and smaller school districts defended
their funding levels and argued that, with the funding formula based
on enrollment, additional dollars are necessary to provide quality edu-
cation.2 7 A rejection of the formula could lead to consolidation of
smaller schools and a reduction in the number of school districts in
Kansas. Fifty districts have fewer than 250 students.28 Plaintiffs ar-
gued that the formula provides too much money to small, rural schools
25. Montoy v. State, No. 99-C-1738 (Shawnee County, Kan. Dist. Ct. May 18, 2004)
(Memorandum Decision and Preliminary Interim Order), available at http://
www.shawneecourt.org/decisions/Montoy(bond).html.
26. Montoy v. State, No. 92,032 (Kan. May 19, 2004) (order granting preliminary in-
junction), available at http://www.kscourts.org/schoolfinanceorder2004O519.pdf.
27. John Milburn, Varied Voices Weigh In on School Finance Case, LAWRENCE J.-
WORLD, Aug. 29, 2004, available at http://6news.ljworld.com/section/schoolfi-
nance/story/179851.
28. RURAL EDUC. FIN. CTR., THE RURAL SCHOOL FUNDING REPORT-VOLUME 2, ISSUE
3 (Feb. 15, 2003), available at http://www.ruraledu.org/issues/finance/news203.
htm#kansas.
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at the expense of districts with relatively high concentrations of poor
and minority students.
29
III. REMEDIAL ORDERS IN SCHOOL FINANCE CASES
An initial reaction to Judge Bullock's school-closing order may be
that he was usurping powers of the legislative and executive branches
of government and indulging in judicial activism. But, the evidence is
against such a conclusion. Judge Bullock "describes his judicial phi-
losophy as 'basically conservative."' 30 His actions in Montoy indicate
that he was meticulously trying to follow the law and guidance of the
Kansas Supreme Court and give proper recognition to the functions of
each branch of government. In fact, he initially dismissed the suit
based upon the 1994 decision in Unified School District No. 229, but
the Kansas Supreme Court overruled him. In his December 2003 pre-
liminary order, he set out a separate section on his proposed remedy,
where he emphasized the different responsibilities given to the three
branches of government in the Kansas Constitution. His opinion
makes it clear that he preferred to avoid the coercive action
31 of clos-
ing schools and preferred that a solution be reached by the legislature
and the governor, much like what had occurred after his opinion in
Mock v. State.3 2 What led Judge Bullock to enter such a radical, far-
reaching, remedial order in which he ordered schools to close if the
state legislature did not remedy the situation, was a combination of
the circumstances existing in Kansas as well as nationwide.
As Judge Bullock stated in both his December and May orders, the
Kansas school finance scheme "dramatically and adversely impacted
the learning and educational performance of the most vulnerable and/
or protected Kansas children [which] occurred by virtue of underfund-
ing, generally, and selective underfunding of ... schools."
33 He also
recognized that remedial orders in school finance cases have been un-
predictable and in many cases ineffectual. Many courts have been re-
luctant, for a number of reasons, to become too actively involve in
school finance controversies, preferring to defer to the political
29. Associated Press, Small School Districts Officials Nervous About School Finance
Case, Sept. 5, 2004, available at http://www.kansas.com/mld/kansas/news/state/
9590801.htm
30. Berger, supra note 9, at 16.
31. Injunctions are generally viewed as coercive remedies. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES, 2.9-.10, at 93-113 (1973).
32. In Mock, Judge Bullock also threatened to close schools if the legislature did not
take corrective action. Steve Painter, Can Judge Force Action on Schools?, KAN-
SAS.COM, THE WICHITA EAGLE, Dec. 7, 2003, at http://www.kansas.com/mld/kan-
sas/news/state/7432705.htm.
33. Montoy v. State, No. 99-C-1738, 2004 WL 1094555, at *3 (Shawnee County, Kan.
Dist. Ct. May 11, 2004) (Decision and Order Remedy), available at http://www.
shawneecourt.org/decisions/Montoy(REMEDY).html.
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branches of government. Additionally, because of the impact on a
state treasury and taxpayers, courts have responded to school finance
litigation by leaving remedial measures to legislatures even when a
constitutional violation is found.34 However, there is a continued role
for the courts. As Rebell and Hughes have put it, "[w]ithout judicial
guidance and oversight, the legislative and executive branches can not
realistically be expected to solve these confrontational problems-
which come to the courts' attention in the first place largely because
the other branches fail to deal with them."3 5 The state courts have
deferred to the legislatures to take action and have avoided what has
been described by some as the federal court model 36 of institutional
reform.37 Institutional reform litigation in federal court that involves
schools, prisons, jails, and other government institutions38 has re-
sulted in the courts exercising remedial powers that are not present in
typical judicial remedies. The desegregation cases that arose after
Brown are often discussed as instances of institutional reform
litigation.39
The traditional approach of having the state courts decide if rights
have been violated and then turning the matter over to the legislature
to formulate a remedy has not been successful in school finance cases.
Consider for example, the DeRolph4o school-funding case in Ohio. In
1991 a lawsuit was filed against the state of Ohio claiming that the
school-funding system was unconstitutional. In 1994, a district court
judge found education to be a fundamental right in Ohio and that the
Ohio funding system was unconstitutional. In 1997, the Ohio Su-
34. See generally George D. Brown, Binding Advisory Opinions: A Federal Courts
Perspective on the State School Finance Decisions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 543 (1994).
35. Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Efficacy and Engagement: The Remedies
Problem Posed by Sheff v. O'Neill-and a Proposed Solution, 29 CONN. L. REV.
1115, 1119 (1997); See also Jonathan Banks, Note, State Constitutional Analyses
of Public School Finance Reform Cases: Myth or Methodology?, 45 VAND. L. REV.
129, 154-55 (1991) (suggesting that courts are more willing to order remedial
action when they conclude that legislatures will not pass the necessary remedial
legislation).
36. Rebell & Hughes, supra note 35, at 1120.
37. See generally Brown, supra note 34, at 543.
38. See Molly Townes O'Brien, At the Intersection of Public Policy and Private Pro-
cess: Court-Ordered Mediation and the Remedial Process in School Funding Liti-
gation, 18 OIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 391 (2003) (citing Theodore Eisenberg &
Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litiga-
tion, 93 HARv. L. REV. 465, 467 n.6 (1980) (typically requiring the courts to scruti-
nize the operation of large public institutions, examples include challenges to
conditions in prison and in mental hospitals, and litigation involving voting dis-
tricts and school desegregation)); see also Margo Schlanger, Beyond the Hero
Judge: Institution Reform Litigation as Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1994 (1999).
39. See e.g., Susan Poser, Termination of Desegregation Degrees and the Elusive
Meaning of Unitary Status, 81 NEB. L. REV. 283, 295-99 (2002).
40. DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1977) [DeRolph I].
[Vol. 83:901
CLOSING THE SCHOOL DOORS IN KAN.
preme Court upheld the decision.4 1 Starting with 1997, four Ohio Su-
preme Court decisions ruled that the system was unconstitutional.42
After the court's second decision in 2000, and the legislature's failure
to adequately change the system, some commentators characterized
the actions of Ohio's legislature as defiance and urged the court to
take a more active role in the remedial process. 4 3 The court's third
opinion in DeRolph v. State, stated that there was "no reason to retain
jurisdiction" and that "[i]f the order receives less than full compliance,
interested parties have remedies available to them."44 The court ap-
pointed a mediator in December 2001 with the hopes of resolving the
funding issues.45 The mediation failed,46 and in December 2002, in
response to a motion for reconsideration, the court vacated its opinion
in DeRolph III. The court then issued its fourth opinion of unconstitu-
tionality and found that the legislature had not complied with the
court's previous orders.4 7 The court directed the legislature "to enact
a school-funding scheme that is thorough and efficient, as explained in
DeRolph I, DeRolph II, and the accompanying concurrences," 4 s but
decided to not retain jurisdiction over the case. In response to an ac-
tion filed in the County Common Pleas Court seeking an order compel-
ling state officials to comply with the supreme court's December 2002
ruling, in May 2003, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a Writ of Prohibi-
tion sought by the State and barring the county judge from conducting
any further proceedings in the DeRolph school-funding case.4
9 The
court stated that "[the duty now lies with the General Assembly to
remedy an educational system that has been found by the majority in
DeRolph IV to still be unconstitutional."50 On August 13, 2003, the
41. Id.
42. Id. (declaring the school-funding system unconstitutional by a 4-3 vote); DeR-
olph v. State, 728 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 2000) [DeRolph II] (Lawmakers have made
strides in the right direction by increasing funding to education, however, the
system was still found unconstitutional. The court gave the legislature until
June 15, 2001 to fix it.); DeRolph v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1184 (Ohio 2001) [DeRolph
III]; DeRolph v. State, 780 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio 2002) [DeRolph IV] (leaving in place
its DeRolph III decision; held that the General Assembly had failed to meet the
mandates of the court's first two orders in the case). See State ex rel. State v.
Lewis, 789 N.E.2d 195, 197 (Ohio 2003).
43. See, e.g., Suzanne Ernst Drummond, Comment, Deja Vu: The Status of School
Funding in Ohio After DeRolph II, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 435, 460 (2000).
44. DeRolph III, 754 N.E.2d at 1201.
45. DeRolph v. State, 760 N.E.2d 351 (Ohio 2001).
46. Howard S. Bellman, Master Commissioner's Report, DeRolph v. State, 754 N.E.2d
1184 (Ohio Mar. 21, 2002), available at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/derolph/
bellman3-21.pdf.
47. DeRolph IV, 780 N.E. 2d 529.
48. Id. at 530.
49. State ex rel. State v. Lewis, 789 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 966
(Oct. 20, 2003).
50. Id. at 202.
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plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court, which was denied on October 20, 2003. Thus, the
plaintiffs in Ohio remain with a finding of unconstitutionality but no
remedial order for enforcement.
As Rebell has stated:
[Flew of the [school finance] victories have resulted in reforms that have
demonstrably ameliorated the inequities. [Olverall, the record is disap-
pointing. In some states, court orders have been virtually ignored; in others,
the courts have felt compelled repeatedly to strike down legislative responses
which were inadequate or unconstitutional or both. 5 1
An article written by Professor Kaden two decades ago, in which he
advocates greater state court involvement in school finance reform,
continues to be convincing. 5 2 In an article describing the strategy
used to obtain a desegregation/school finance victory from the Con-
necticut Supreme Court in Sheff v. O'Neill,53 Professor Brittain ex-
presses his disappointment with the progress made in the remedial
phase of the litigation by stating that "[w]henever the courts put the
remedy back into the hands of the perpetrator, they commit the first
basic mistake."54 Judge Bullock has recognized this need for more
state court involvement in school finance controversies.
In his Remedy Order, Judge Bullock cited a number of states
where there has arguably been a failure to correct school financing
problems because the state legislative remedies have not implemented
the necessary reforms for achieving the rights as defined by the
courts. In many cases, courts were compelled to utilize various tech-
niques to oversee the actions of the legislature, including the appoint-
ment of special masters, 55 the imposition of time deadlines for
51. Michael A. Rebell, Fiscal Equality in Education: Deconstructing the Reigning
Myths and Facing Reality, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 691, 693-94 (1995)
(citations omitted).
52. See Lewis B. Kaden, Courts and Legislatures in a Federal System: The Case of
School Finance, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1205, 1255-59 (1983). See also Note, Unful-
filled Promises: School Finance Remedies and State Courts, 104 HARv. L. REV.
1072, 1072 (1991) (asserting that "unwarranted judicial deference to the political
branches in the remedial phase hinder[s] the school finance plaintiffs prospects
for securing a constitutional remedy").
53. 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
54. Symposium, Brown v. Board of Education at Fifty: Have We Achieved Its Goals?,
78 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 281, 286 (2004) (Remarks of John C. Brittain). See also
David M. Engstrom, Civil Rights Paradox? Lawyers and Educational Equity, 10
J.L. & POLY 387, 404 (2002) (concluding that the court's deference to the legisla-
tive and executive branches resulted in no significant change to the financing of
racially isolated schools). In January 2003, the plaintiffs and Governor reached a
settlement in Sheff v. O'Neill, which was approved by the General Assembly and
the trial court. See Michael Besso, Sheff v. O'Neill: The Connecticut Supreme
Court at the Bar of Politics, 22 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 165 (2003).
55. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472 (Ark. 2002); Abbott v.
Burke, 710 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1998).
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corrective action, 56 the maintaining of jurisdiction to oversee the im-
plementation of a proper remedy,5 7 and even handing down school-
funding provisions that were to be adopted by the legislature.58
As Mills and McClendon have concluded, improvement in an edu-
cation system "depends upon the legislature responding positively and
comprehensively to a court declaration."59 Professor Dyson has sug-
gested that it may be time for litigants to rethink the remedial phase
of school finance litigation. 60 Professor Ryan has also observed that
"court decisions . . .often wax grandiloquent in describing the rights
involved and wane to the point of silence when it comes to specifying a
remedy."6 1 Judge Bullock's approach is consistent with these admoni-
tions. His first approach is for the judiciary and the political branches
of government to work together to solve the school finance problem
and then only use extraordinary measures when a failure occurs.
Having found that the present system was unconstitutional, he rea-
soned that it was therefore void and could not be used to fund the
school districts.6 2 Judge Bullock has faced head-on the issue of reme-
dial orders necessary to implement findings of unconstitutional school
finance formulas. A number of commentators have praised Judge Bul-
lock's actions, including Pennsylvania Congressman Chaka Fattah
who issued a press release commending Judge Bullock.63 Congress-
man Fattah has introduced a Student Bill of Rights,64 which is aimed
at providing public school systems with adequate and equitable
resources.
56. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326 (N.Y. 2003) (The New
York court gave the state one year); McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of
Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993).
57. Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. North Carolina Bd. of Educ., 95 CVS 1158 (Wake
County, N.C. Dist. Ct. 2002).
58. Montoy v. State, No. 99-C-1738, 2004 WL 1094555, at *19 (Shawnee County,
Kan. Dist. Ct. May 11, 2004) (Decision and Order Remedy), available at http:l
www.shawneecourt.org/decisions/Montoy(REMEDY).html.
59. Jon Mills & Timothy Mclendon, Setting a New Standard for Public Education:
Revision 6 Increases the Duty of the State to Make "Adequate Provision" for Flor-
ida Schools, 52 FLA. L. REV. 329, 383 (2000).
60. Maurice R. Dyson, A Covenant Broken: The Crisis of Educational Remedy for New
York City's Failing Schools, 44 How. L.J. 107 (2000).
61. James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School Finance Reform, 98 MICH. L. REV.
432 n.116 (1999).
62. Montoy v. State, No. 99-C-1738, 2004 WL 1094555, at *20 (Shawnee County,
Kan. Dist. Ct. May 11, 2004) (Decision and Order Remedy), available at http:/l
www.shawneecourt.org/decisions/Montoy(REMEDY).html.
63. News Release, Office of Congressman Chaka Fattah, Congressman Fattah Com-
mends Kansas School Finance Ruling (Dec. 2, 2003), available at http://www.
house.gov/apps/list/press/pa02_fattah/Kansas Ruling.html.
64. H.R. 236, 108th Cong. (2003) (providing for adequate and equitable educational
opportunities for students in State public school systems, and for other purposes)
(Congressman Fattah and 180 co-sponsors have introduced legislation that would
establish a Student Bill of Rights).
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IV. SCHOOL CLOSINGS AND EQUAL
EDUCATION OPPORTUNITY
Even if it is conceded that courts should become more actively in-
volved in constructing remedial measures, the question remains as to
whether closing schools is an appropriate remedy. School closings
have a generally negative history in the attainment of equal education
opportunity. Such actions have often been viewed as a method of re-
sistance to avoid equal education opportunity.
School closings were the method of massive resistance65 used in
connection with desegregation orders. In those situations, it was the
school boards, governors and legislatures that were resisting court or-
ders and closing schools to prevent students from obtaining equal edu-
cation opportunity. In desegregation situations, closing schools was
an unprecedented act of defiance.66 When Brown led to the issuance
of desegregation orders for Little Rock, Arkansas schools, and the at-
tendance of the Little Rock Nine at Central High School in 1957, after
the end of the school year, the governor called the legislature into spe-
cial session to obtain broad powers to prevent desegregation of the
schools. 67 This grant of authority led Governor Faubus to close the
high schools in 1958 and attempt to use public schools leased to pri-
vate school corporations to avoid integration. Hundreds of high school
students lost a year of high school and some never returned. 68
In 1959, the Prince Edward County, Virginia County Board of Su-
pervisors refused to appropriate funds for the operation of public
schools in an attempt to avoid integration. A private foundation was
established to operate schools for white children only, who in 1960 be-
came eligible for county and state tuition grants.69 Prince Edward
County was one of the five cases that led to the Brown decision. Vir-
ginia's school-closing law was ruled unconstitutional in January
65. See generally Judith A. Hagley, Massive Resistance-The Rhetoric and the Real-
ity, 27 N.M. L. REV. 167 (1997).
66. See, e.g., Reed v. Rhodes, 179 F.3d 453, 474 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting the "menacing
history" of the school board's "resistance, defiance, and utter disregard for [reme-
dial] orders").
67. Governor's School-Closing Proclamation, 3 RACE REL. L. REP. 869 (1958); see also
Act No. 4 of the 1958 Extraordinary Session of the Arkansas Legislature, 3 RACE
REL. L. REP. 1048-49 (1958).
68. For a discussion of Little Rock and desegregation, see JUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON
THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS, 1954-1965 at 91-119 (1987).
69. See generally J. KENNETH MORLAND, THE TRAGEDY OF CLOSED PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY, VIRGINIA: A REPORT FOR THE VIRGINIA ADVISORY COM-
MITTEE TO THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS (1964), available at
http://www.library.vcu.edu/jbc/speccoll/report1964.pdf; ROBERT C. SMITH, THEY
CLOSED THEIR SCHOOLS: PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1951-1964 (1965).
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1959,70 both by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and a federal
district court. The state legislature then repealed the compulsory
school attendance law and made the operation of public schools a local
option for the state's counties and cities. 7 1 Hundreds of black school
children had no schooling from 1959 until 1963. Public schools were
finally reopened and integrated when the U.S. Supreme Court held in
Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County7 2 that Vir-
ginia's tuition grants to private education was unlawful.
Desegregation orders in many states also led to the closing of Afri-
can-American schools in favor of busing into white neighborhoods.
This also resulted in the loss of jobs for black teachers based upon the
assumption that white parents did not want black teachers for their
children. 73 Some African-Americans boycotted school closings and
transfers and requested additional funding to improve their schools.
The pursuit of equal education opportunity by black children in the
south is still sometimes counteracted with school closings. Now the
closings come in the form of school consolidation. Take, for example,
Lake View School District in Arkansas. Lake View is a rural school
district with an all-black student body. After Lake View sued and won
in court,74 the state implemented a school finance plan which would
force the school district to close and consolidate with another school
district. The consolidation plans from some state legislatures have re-
sulted in the consolidation of rural districts into unified school dis-
tricts and the closure of many small rural schools. 75 Thus, school
finance litigation by rural school districts has been avoided in some
circumstances for fear of being punished for their actions by a school
consolidation plan.
Judge Bullock's order and remedy, however, is not based upon any
of the negatives associated with desegregation closings or consolida-
tion closings. Judge Bullock has issued an order with the hopes of
motivating the legislature and the executive branch to resolve the in-
equitable and inadequate system. All school children stand to benefit
from this "coerced" action. While some rural districts may not look
70. James v. Almond, 170 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Va. 1959) (violation of Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution); Harrison v. Day, 106 S.E.2d 636 (Va. 1959)
(violation of section 129 of Virginia's State Constitution).
71. Even prior to Brown, some states had passed laws allowing the closing of schools
to avoid integration. See Kevin D. Brown, Reexamination of the Benefit of Pub-
licly Funded Private Education for African-American Students in a Post-Desegre-
gation Era, 36 IND. L. REV. 477, 492-93 (2003).
72. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
73. See generally Greg Toppo, Thousands of Black Teachers Lost Jobs, USA TODAY,
April 28, 2004, at D06.
74. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472 (Ark. 2002), cert denied,
538 U.S. 1035 (May 19, 2003).
75. See generally Robert M. Bastress, The Impact of Litigation on Rural Students:
From Free Textbooks to School Consolidation, 82 NEB. L. REV. 9 (2003).
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favorably on Judge Bullock's order because it could mean the creation
of a school finance formula that gives rural school districts less
favorable financing than urban districts76 and result in them being at
a disadvantage if the school formula is altered, a revised formula that
carefully considers the needs of individual students should result in
increased funding for the entire system rather than a redistribution of
existing funds. The bold step taken by Judge Bullock should be en-
forced by the Kansas Supreme Court and modeled in other states.
There is evidence that this type of action can get results. In New
Jersey, when the legislature did not authorize appropriate funding for
a remedial school finance plan, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled
in Robinson v. Cahill,v7 that the existing system was unconstitutional
and enjoined "every public officer, state, county or municipal... from
expending any funds for the support of any free public school."7 8 The
schools were closed for the summer and, several weeks later, the legis-
lature had adopted a new educational plan and enacted New Jersey's
first income tax.
V. CONCLUSION
Drastic measures are required by courts when the political
branches of government have not provided for fair access to services
provided by public institutions. This is particularly true when the ser-
vice is education. Courts recognized that drastic measures were
needed when some states resisted the implementation of the Supreme
Court's mandate in Brown v. Board of Education to end segregation.
Judge Bullock has recognized that a similar situation exists when
there is a finding that the State has failed to adopt a school finance
system that provides an adequate and equitable education for all chil-
dren. By issuing his order to close the schools, Judge Bullock sent a
strong message to the political branches that corrective measures, as
well as extraordinary judicial remedies, may be needed when it is es-
tablished that the State has an unconstitutional system of school
finance.
76. See generally RURAL EDUC. FIN. CTR., RURAL SCHOOL FUNDING REPORT-VOLUME
3, IssuE 7 at 3 (July 2003), available at http://www.ruraledu.org/issues/finance/
news307.htm.
77. 358 A.2d 457 (N.J. 1976).
78. Id. at 459.
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